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Plain English Summary The key role of peer 
groups in informal investment. In this paper, we use a 
large multi-country database (Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor) to explore what leads people to become an 
informal investor in new ventures. Informal investors, 
sometimes referred to in developed economies as busi-
ness angels but also a widespread phenomenon in devel-
oping countries, play a key role in the formation and 
establishment of new ventures in the early stages, sec-
ond only to the entrepreneurs themselves. We identify 
two crucial factors determining the decision to become 
an informal investor, namely, prior experience as an 
entrepreneur and membership of a peer group with high 
entrepreneurial experience (social homophily). Thus, 
individuals are more likely to become informal inves-
tors when their peers, in groups defined by age, gender, 
education, income and neighbourhood, have higher lev-
els of entrepreneurial business experience. Moreover, 
membership of an experienced peer group can to some 
extent substitute for deficiencies in one’s own entrepre-
neurial experience. Our work highlights the importance 
of social networks, role models and peer group–based 
entrepreneurial ecosystems in fostering entrepreneurship 
in developing as well as developed economies.
Keywords Informal investors · Entrepreneurial 
experience · Social homophily · Peer influence · 
Entrepreneurship capital · Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM) · Angel investors
JEL classifications L26 · M13 · G32
Abstract Conceptualising early-stage new venture 
informal investors as co-entrepreneurs whose actions 
are socially embedded, we examine the role of social 
influence and how it interplays with entrepreneurial 
experience at the individual level leading to informal 
investment. We extend theories of social homophily 
and social influence to argue that informal investment 
decisions are influenced by shared experience and 
entrepreneurism in peer groups. We test our hypoth-
eses with a multi-level model using first a large cross-
country dataset and next in depth within a country. 
Our analysis reveals that both individual entrepre-
neurship experience and peer group-embedded expe-
rience significantly influence the likelihood that an 
individual becomes an early-stage investor. Further-
more, these social effects substitute for the lack of 
individual entrepreneurial experience.
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1 Introduction
Early-stage informal investment spans across 
developed and emerging countries, with investors 
representing an important group of players in new 
venture creation, often the most important ones 
other than the founder themselves (Wetzel, 1983, 
1987). This is because the former are providers of 
critical early finance to entrepreneurs at the start 
of new venture development (Burke et  al., 2014; 
Korosteleva & Mickiewicz, 2011; Wetzel, 1983). 
Moreover, they are intrinsically motivated and 
often personally engaged in the creation of the new 
firm. In this paper, we conceptualise them as entre-
preneurial co-decision-makers who are embedded 
in their own social environment. This leads us to 
investigate, first theoretically and then empirically, 
the role of social influence and how it interplays 
with entrepreneurial experience at the individual 
level, leading to informal investment in the early 
stage of the new venture.
The literature on informal investment has 
largely focused on the role of angel investors 
(Drover et  al., 2017;  Levratto  et al., 2018; Tenca 
et al., 2018; Wetzel, 1987), but angels are primar-
ily a developed economy phenomenon (Riding, 
2008; Sohl, 2003; Stedler & Peters, 2003). It is the 
more general construct of informal investor that is 
much more widespread globally: as Edelman et al. 
(2017) argue, there is no ‘robust angel investment 
community internationally’ (Ibid, p. 266). Because 
we focus on early-stage new venture funding in 
both developed and emerging economies, we 
emphasise the more general concept of early-stage 
informal investment rather than the more geo-
graphically restricted idea of angel investment.
Early-stage informal investors are typically 
closely linked to the entrepreneur, as friends, asso-
ciates or close or extended family members (Aram, 
1989; Korosteleva & Mickiewicz, 2011; Land-
ström, 1998; Mason, 2008; Maxwell, 2011;  Sul-
livan & Miller, 1996). Hence, their motivation as 
investors is often very different from that of more 
conventional providers of finance. In addition 
to financial return, their objectives may include 
intrinsic benefits arising from the creation of a new 
venture by somebody that they know personally. 
This is consistent with their willingness to invest 
in entrepreneurial ventures at a very early stage — 
often without a tested product or a proven business 
model — when there is little basis to assess risks; 
unsurprisingly, trust plays a key role in informal 
investment (Harrison et al., 1997).
Moreover, informal investors have ‘skin in the 
game’ (Taleb, 2018); they invest their own money, 
not on behalf of others. Because of this individual 
agency, we posit that informal investors’ actions will 
be influenced by both their own entrepreneurial expe-
riences and also by the social structures around them, 
in particular, by the experience of their peer groups. 
Drawing upon Audretsch and Keilbach (2004, 2007), 
we denote the entrepreneurialism of one’s peer group 
as (network) entrepreneurship capital and identify 
two types of social homophily effects: (1) between 
informal investors and their investment recipients 
resulting from shared experience and (2) pertaining 
to network entrepreneurship capital in peer groups. 
Thus, we argue that the choice to engage as an infor-
mal investor is affected by the individual’s entrepre-
neurial experience, their corresponding social experi-
ence of peer groups (entrepreneurship capital) and the 
individual–peer interplay of the two. Furthermore, we 
expect that entrepreneurship capital will compensate 
for the lack of individual experience of early stage 
informal investors as a consequence of learning and 
knowledge spillover effects within peer groups.
To test our hypotheses, we use a large dataset 
(the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) sur-
vey) containing information of 1,287,997 individuals 
across 92 countries and 14 years; as well as a large 
country-specific sub-sample to explore peer effects in 
more depth. The structure of the data leads us to uti-
lise multi-level econometric techniques. We find that 
individuals with greater entrepreneurial capital are 
more inclined to invest in other entrepreneurs’ ven-
tures than those without such personal experiences. 
However, social effects are also important, both in 
their own right and as a substitute for entrepreneurial 
capital: the positive effect of social entrepreneurship 
capital is more important for informal investors with 
less of their own entrepreneurial experience.
Besides testing social influence in the multi-
country dataset, we also performed further analy-
sis to verify if and how the homophily effects we 
postulated might change when we focus on within-
country regional variation instead. For this pur-
pose, we utilise GEM data with location identifiers 
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for 2002–20191 in the UK — one of the  very few 
countries with large enough annual samples to allow 
meaningful regional comparisons (Hart et al., 2020). 
We discuss these findings in comparison with the 
cross-country analysis to flesh out the nuances of the 
role of social context.
Our study contributes to the entrepreneurship lit-
erature in several ways. First, we develop a model 
in which informal investment decisions are influ-
enced by social homophily effects in peer groups. 
We thereby extend the informal investment literature 
from a focus on the narrower concept of business 
angels — who usually operate on a formal or con-
tractual basis and primarily in developed countries 
— to the broader concept of informal investors. We 
draw on the key role of peer groups in the relation-
ship between informal investors and entrepreneurs to 
develop and test theoretical arguments about entre-
preneurship capital and social homophily effects. In 
so doing, we advance the literature on informal inves-
tors’ behaviour (Burke et  al., 2014; Korosteleva & 
Mickiewicz, 2011).
Secondly, our study provides an analysis of how 
social influence shapes informal investors’ decisions 
both directly and by moderating individual-level 
factors. We test these effects in multi-level models. 
Methodologically, it is usually difficult to test cross-
level effects (e.g. individual meso) in a single study 
due to data constraints (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000), 
because datasets with meso-level information are usu-
ally only available for samples within a single coun-
try, rarely with the coverage of multiple countries. 
Adopting the concept of peer groups allows us to 
construct meso-level peer influence variables and to 
test them in conjunction with individual-level effects 
in one of the largest entrepreneurship datasets. This 
novel approach opens a new avenue for cross-level 
analysis for future studies (Kim et al., 2016).
Finally, we contribute to the literature on entre-
preneurship by applying the theory lenses of social 
homophily and social influence in the novel set-
ting of early-stage new venture informal invest-
ment. Although social homophily and social influ-
ence effects  have been studied in a variety of 
settings related to  entrepreneurship (e.g. Greenberg 
& Mollick, 2015, 2017;  Kacperczyk, 2013; Nanda 
& Sørensen, 2010; Qin, 2011;  Qin & Estrin, 2015; 
Stuart & Ding, 2006; Tartari et  al., 2014; Thornton, 
1999), they have rarely been examined in the context 
of the meso-societal level. By taking into account 
meso-societal-level social influence, we capture an 
understudied but important type of social influence 
— that from one’s broader peer groups beyond the 
individual’s immediate networks. Our results there-
fore provide further validation of the related theory in 
an important new setting.
In the next section, we present our theory and 
motivate our hypotheses. The subsequent section 
is on data and methods. Further down, we present 
results and robustness checks. In the final part of the 
paper, we offer discussion and conclusions.
2  Theoretical background and hypotheses
2.1  Informal investor: beyond financial provision
Informal investors are motivated by social ties as well 
as financial returns and may therefore have long time 
horizons2 (Aram, 1989). Indeed, the stewardship view 
(Davis et al., 1997) suggests that informal investors’ 
motives are closer to those of founders than of finan-
ciers, in that they are often intrinsically rather than 
extrinsically motivated and their focus is more on 
involvement than control ( Edelman et al., 2017; Poli-
tis & Landström, 2002). Moreover, in contrast to for-
mal investors such as venture capitalists, who invest 
on behalf of their providers of finance and expect to 
exit within a limited time period (linked to the hori-
zon of those investors), informal investors invest their 
own money and are less constrained with respect to 
time of exit (Harrison & Mason, 2002). Thus, infor-
mal investors are typically involved from the initial 
stage of new business formation, unlike venture capi-
talists who come at a later stage of venture develop-
ment (Gompers & Lerner, 2004).
Thus, the role of informal investors also goes 
well beyond simply supplying funding: instead, 
1 We are grateful to Mark Hart and Neha Prashar  for sharing 
the harmonised UK GEM data for the purpose of this exercise.
2 Thus, the phenomenon we analyse shares some features with 
family firm engagement (Barros et al., 2017) in that the socio-
economic wealth created within families or between friends 
can be appropriated for the sake of business venturing. How-
ever, the major difference is that informal investors are not the 
owner-managers of the new venture.
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they tend to behave in a manner closer to partners 
of the founders, that is to say, as co-entrepreneurs 
(Politis & Landström, 2002; Politis, 2008). Infor-
mal investors are exposed to the same and, consid-
erable, downside risks from the new venture ideas 
as venture capitalists (and entrepreneurs), but they 
mitigate these risks by active involvement in the 
operations of the business (Kerr et al., 2014).
At this point, we need to introduce a brief 
digression on terminology. It is widely agreed 
that informal investors fill an important equity 
gap between self-funding and later-stage equity 
investment (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Harrison 
& Mason, 1992; Hellmann et  al., 2017; Manigart 
& Wright, 2013; Sullivan & Miller, 1996). Earlier 
discussions of informal investors describe a class 
of financiers implicitly based in developed econo-
mies, who provide seed capital to new ventures 
(Wetzel, 1983). Later on, the Global Entrepre-
neurship Monitor project (Reynolds et  al., 2005) 
adopted the term ‘business angels’ to describe all 
early-stage informal investors, and this was also 
introduced in the GEM-based empirical literature 
(Wong et  al., 2004). However, this usage differs 
from the way that ‘business angels’ are defined in 
the finance literature (Edelman et al., 2017), much 
of which focuses on developed countries. The wide 
presence of informal capital is one of the unique 
aspects of entrepreneurial financing in emerging 
economies where the access to formal sources of 
capital is more constrained (Wu et al., 2016). Thus, 
informal investment is a far more widespread phe-
nomenon than just business angel finance, and it 
can be found in both developed and developing 
economy settings (Burke et  al., 2014; Korosteleva 
& Mickiewicz, 2011).
In sum, informal investors are a distinct group of 
actors in new venture creation, often working closely 
with entrepreneurs on the basis of strong social ties. 
We therefore model informal investors as a type of 
entrepreneurial individual who brings tacit knowl-
edge as well as finance to the new venture; they are 
not simply another class of financial intermediary. 
This leads us to emphasise the role of individual 
experience and knowledge as well as the accumulated 
entrepreneurial experience in the social environment 
of their peer groups.
2.2  Individual entrepreneurial experience 
Prior studies from a variety of disciplines have examined 
the role of entrepreneurial experience in shaping new 
venture outcomes (e.g. Chandler, 1996;  Davidsson & 
Honig, 2003; Estrin et  al., 2016; Lazear, 2004;  Qin 
et al., 2017). If early-stage informal investors are more 
like partners to the founders, even co-entrepreneurs, 
then, their individual attributes, especially their 
entrepreneurial experience, may influence their 
propensity to become engaged in the new venture. We 
posit that entrepreneurial experience will help informal 
investors to advise entrepreneurs and so improve the 
value of such investments to both parties.
Entrepreneurship is a unique type of economic 
activity that requires specific skills about how to 
organise ideas and capabilities in order to produce 
new products and services under uncertain conditions 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Davidsson, 2016; 
Mickiewicz et al., 2017; Qin et al., 2019). Knowledge 
pertaining to the firm-founding process, especially 
tacit knowledge or know-how, is usually obtained 
from previous experience in similar activities (Estrin 
et al., 2016), and prior entrepreneurial experience can 
therefore make someone more skilled in assessing the 
quality of new venture ideas (Collewaert & Manigart, 
2016). Individuals who already have firm-founding 
experience may therefore be better equipped with 
expertise needed by new ventures. The development 
of a new venture may also be influenced by investors’ 
injections of relevant and valuable network capital 
(Tenca et  al., 2018; Wetzel, 1983), which again 
accumulates with entrepreneurial experience. The 
literature has also shown that informal investors 
support entrepreneurs as mentors and often inject 
human and social capital (Mason, 2016; Tenca et al, 
2018; Wetzel, 1983) including through the provision 
of strategic and operational expertise (Edelman 
et al., 2017). They can also be a source of soft skills 
and business judgement (Becker-Blease & Sohl, 
2015), as well as helping entrepreneurs to develop 
their presentational skills (Clark, 2008). Prior 
entrepreneurship experience can therefore increase 
the value of informal investors’ contribution to the 
new venture by increasing entrepreneurs’ skills and 
by enhancing their confidence. This may be in part 
a direct learning effect; past experience can help to 
accumulate and integrate new knowledge, facilitating 
application to new situations (Weick, 1996).  People 
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with prior entrepreneurship experience may also be 
more willing to invest in new ventures because of  a 
stronger and more focused entrepreneurial mindset 
(McGrath & Macmillan, 2000), which then prompts 
them to assume the risks of investing in start-ups 
(Estrin et al., 2018; Tenca et al., 2018).
At the same time, social homophily theory predicts 
that  ties are likely  to be formed between parties with 
shared characteristics (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; 
McPherson et al., 2001). Homophily effects have been 
examined in a variety of contexts, to explain both 
interpersonal and interorganizational relationships 
(Ahuja et al., 2009; Duncan et al., 1968; Fernandez & 
Sosa, 2005;  Greenberg & Mollick, 2015, 2017; Hegde 
& Tumlinson, 2014; Kandel, 1966; Kleinbaum  et al., 
2013; Kossinets & Watts, 2009; Ibarra, 1992; Powell 
et  al., 2005; Rosenkopf & Padula, 2008; Rubineau & 
Fernandez, 2013; Wimmer & Lewis, 2010; Zeng & Xie, 
2008). It is known that entrepreneurs form a distinctive 
occupational category who share many common 
characteristics (Barringer et  al., 2005; Davidsson 
& Honig, 2003; Lofstrom et  al., 2014; Unger et  al., 
2011). Shared experience based on entrepreneurship 
can be contrasted with that based on more hierarchical 
work activities, as a distinctive foundation for social 
linkages based on occupation (McPherson et al., 2001). 
Individuals with past entrepreneurial experience may 
therefore be more willing to support those who are 
now engaged in similar entrepreneurial endeavours, 
appreciating and understanding the efforts of other 
entrepreneurs. While these arguments are familiar 
for entrepreneurs, they have been  less commonly 
considered for informal investors, and they represent a 
building block for our subsequent theorising.
We therefore propose as a baseline the following 
hypothesis:
H1: Individuals with entrepreneurial experience 
have a higher propensity to act on a new venture 
idea as an informal investor.
2.3  Entrepreneurship capital
It is a core insight of sociology that individual business 
actions are embedded in their social environment 
(Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985). Previous 
research has stressed  the relevance of social context 
for entrepreneurial activities (Bjørnskov & Foss, 2013; 
Davidsson, 2016; Foss et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2016; Qin, 
2011; Qin et  al., 2017;  Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 
2011; Welter, 2011). Moreover, peer influence has been 
identified as a driving force of entrepreneurship (Lerner 
& Malmendier, 2013;  Kacperczyk, 2013; Nanda & 
Sørensen, 2010; Qin & Estrin, 2015; Stuart & Ding, 
2006; Tartari et al., 2014; Thornton, 1999). We extend 
these arguments to the situation of informal investors, 
proposing that the societal context, particularly activities 
undertaken by other individuals in peer groups (Becker-
Blease & Sohl, 2007), is a key mechanism through 
which potential investable entrepreneurial ventures are 
identified and evaluated.
Being an early-stage informal investor in a new ven-
ture relies on the exploitation of informal networks 
(Mason & Harrison, 1997). Indeed, Maula et al., (2005, 
p. 463) emphasise the importance of ‘knowing entre-
preneurs personally’ for being an informal investor, and 
such arguments generalise, because of low transactions 
and communications costs in a digital world, to broader 
social networks and peer groups (Goldfarb & Tucker, 
2019; Sussan & Acs, 2017). Given the tacit character of 
the knowledge that is required, social ties are especially 
instrumental in facilitating the enactment of entrepre-
neurial ideas when they involve parties with entrepre-
neurship-specific knowledge. In particular, we argue that 
a higher density of existing entrepreneurship in a social 
group can lead to a better chance that the relevant ties 
will be formed. A peer environment with a larger number 
of existing entrepreneurs provides both role models and 
more networking opportunities for individuals to form 
those entrepreneurship-relevant ties that are critical for 
access to knowledge and for identifying and obtaining 
other resources including finance (Davidsson & Honig, 
2003). This argument parallels Audretsch and Keilbach’s 
(2004) idea that entrepreneurial activity will be more 
prevalent in social environments with entrepreneurial 
characteristics. We apply their label of entrepreneurship 
capital3 to the network spillover effect and argue that, 
especially in a digitalised economy (Acs et  al., 2021), 
a greater number of entrepreneurs in their peer group 
implies that potential early venture stage informal inves-
tors will be more likely to encounter investment opportu-
nities and start-up projects from which to choose.
3 This mechanism corresponds to the knowledge spillover 
theory of entrepreneurship (Acs et  al., 2009), which argues 
that knowledge-intense environments enhance entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Audretsch & Keilbach, 2007).
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A social environment with a larger number 
of existing entrepreneurs — with high levels of 
entrepreneurial capital — therefore provides more 
opportunities for networking (Hughes  et al., 2007). 
These are critical for access to knowledge and 
for identifying and obtaining other resources, as 
well as to benefit from spillover effects whereby 
entrepreneurs learn from each other (Vismara, 
2016),4 generating more successful matches between 
business founders and early-stage informal investors. 
An entrepreneurship-rich milieu can also exert peer 
influence on the member of the society by increasing 
the visibility of successful ventures and by creating 
role models (Qin & Estrin, 2015). Past research on peer 
influence has suggested that peer influence can occur 
without direct interactions among group members in 
shaping individual’s aspirations and behaviours (e.g. 
Dobrev, 2005; Qin & Estrin, 2015). Thus, peer groups 
should not be narrowly defined by direct interactions 
between group members but rather a group of people 
whom the focal individual may perceive as a reference 
group for their own choices. Higher entrepreneurship 
capital in one’s broader peer group beyond direct 
contacts may shape individuals’ aspirations towards 
entrepreneurial activities and promote a more positive 
social attitude among potential investors towards 
business creation activities, leading people with 
disposable financial resources to favour investments in 
entrepreneurial ventures against alternatives. Higher 
levels of entrepreneurship capital may also foster a 
culture with higher tolerance for risks and failure, 
promoting more of both new ventures and informal 
investments. Thus, we expect that these effects 
(reference, comparison and network-augmenting) 
effects will play a strong role within social peer groups:
H2: The propensity for an individual to invest 
informally in a new venture in its early stage is 
positively influenced by the entrepreneurship capi-
tal in her/his broad peer group.
2.4  Cross-level effects: the interplay of individual 
experience and entrepreneurship capital
We next discuss the interplay of individual entrepre-
neurial experience and peer network entrepreneurial 
capital in influencing informal investment decisions. 
In addition to stimulating investment directly, peer 
effects may also compensate for the lack of indi-
vidual entrepreneurship experience. Individuals who 
do not have such experience can still gain exposure 
to the issues involved in the new venture creation if 
there is a high level of entrepreneurship capital. One 
mechanism through which entrepreneurship capital 
facilitates informal investment is the dissemination of 
knowledge: acting as a conduit to promote the circu-
lation and commercialisation of ‘uncertain and asym-
metric ideas’ among community members (Audretsch 
& Keilbach, 2004, p. 422). Thus, peer groups rich in 
knowledge about, and experience with, entrepreneur-
ial activities are particularly useful for those who are 
less experienced, because the value of the knowledge 
drawn from the environment is relatively greater for 
them. Operating in a dense environment in terms of 
entrepreneurial experience helps informal investors to 
offset any inexperience in entrepreneurship by allow-
ing them to learn from veterans and to build business 
contacts to access information and investment oppor-
tunities. Thus, those who are more limited in their 
personal knowledge and contacts are likely to benefit 
relatively more from such peer group–based knowl-
edge spillover effects. Also, mutual influence in peer 
groups supporting innovation is particularly impor-
tant (McPherson et al., 2001) and that argument eas-
ily extends to entrepreneurship. Therefore, one might 
expect a compensation effect from entrepreneurship-
rich peer contexts, whereby the positive effect of 
entrepreneurship capital will be more important for 
informal investors with less of their own entrepre-
neurial experience. Due to learning and knowledge 
spillover effects within peer groups, we expect that 
entrepreneurship capital will substitute for individual 
experience of early venture stage informal investors:
H3: The effect of an individual’s entrepreneurship 
experience on the propensity to invest in a new 
venture as an informal investor will be attenuated 
for individuals whose peer groups have stronger 
entrepreneurial capital.
4 The positive environmental effects of entrepreneurship 
capital may to some extent be counterbalanced by the impact 
of more intense resource competition among entrepreneurs 
(Audretsch & Keilbach, 2004). However, a larger number of 
entrepreneurs also offers a larger pool of investment opportuni-
ties and a higher quality of start-up projects for investors, who 
may be in a position to pick up the most promising projects to 
support.
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Our conceptual framework is illustrated in Fig. 1.
3  Data and methods
3.1  Data and variables
To test our hypotheses, we use a large dataset 
constructed by combining information from the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), contain-
ing 1,287,997 individuals across 92 countries and 
14  years, with country-level data added from the 
World Bank and from the Polity project. The GEM 
project is seen as unique for entrepreneurship research 
in that it is multi-country, allowing for heterogeneity 
at the macro- and, as we now propose, meso-level, 
but also contains individual data, being based on 
representative population surveys across countries. 
It also uses validated measures of entrepreneurship 
(Davidsson, 2016).
In our analysis, we examine the effects of individ-
ual entrepreneurial experience and social peer influ-
ence on early stage informal investors. We follow 
Ding et al. (2015), and for our dependent variable, we 
use informal investment (busang) in the GEM data-
set; it captures whether an individual has personally 
invested in other businesses in the past 3 years. Note 
that this notion of an early-stage informal investor 
as someone providing financial support is common 
across developed and developing economies contexts: 
the GEM operationalisation therefore overcomes 
context specificity. At the same time, our models are 
robust to the variation in the latter as we utilise wide 
cross-country heterogeneity.
To capture individual entrepreneurship experience, 
we use the indicator (dummy) variable concerning 
engagement in already established projects in which 
individuals are still involved as owner-managers 
(variable 16 in Table 1). As a related control, we also 
include the indicator variable capturing prior engage-
ment in projects that have since been discontinued 
(variable 17 in Table 2). The latter captures a differ-
ent form of experience effect, namely, learning from 
previous business failure.
Turning to the explanatory variables related to 
peer effects (H2 and H3), we operationalise entre-
preneurship capital with meso-level indicators, spe-
cifically, the proportion of business owner-managers 
in each specified social peer group in each country. 
We follow McPherson et  al. (2001) and identify the 
social peer groups in terms of the two primary socio-
demographic characteristics that sort individuals into 
groups within which social networks are likely to 
form, namely, by ascribed characteristics (age and 
gender) and by acquired characteristics (education 
and income). Following this logic, we first calculate 
separate country-male and country-female, means for 
being an owner-manager of an established business, 
assigning it by gender declared by the respondent. 
Next, we calculate proxies for entrepreneurship capi-
tal for ten age categories for each country (at 5 years 
age intervals). For education, we use four groups: no 
secondary level educational attainment; some sec-
ondary; complete secondary; and tertiary, respec-
tively. Finally, for household income, we use the 
available GEM classification distinguishing between 
low-, middle- and high-income groups, again calcu-
lating these means for each country and each peer 
Fig. 1  Hypotheses on 
individual, contextual 
and cross-level effects on 
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group separately and assigning those to the individual 
according to the group to which she/he belongs.
It is important to ensure that these meso-level 
peer effects are not confounded with country-level 
variation. Therefore, following the logic of multilevel 
modelling (e.g. Snijders & Bosker, 2012), in each 
case, we use two variables: (1) the difference between 
the peer group-level effect and the corresponding 
country-level business-owner-manager mean effect, 
alongside (2) the country-level business-owner-man-
ager mean effect. This is a strong and demanding 
formulation that gives some confidence that we have 
isolated the pure (relative) group effect in which we 
are interested.
In our regressions, to address potential issues of 
omitted variable bias, we add the large number of 
explanatory variables at the individual and country 
levels used in previous studies of the determinants 
of entrepreneurial activity (e.g. Autio & Acs, 2010; 
Bowen & De Clercq, 2008; Estrin et  al., 2013a). 
Thus, at the individual level, we control for age, gen-
der, income and the educational attainment of the 
person, as well as whether they are a current owner-
manager of an established firm and if they discontin-
ued one in the last 12 months. At the country level, 
we control for a wide variety of institutional and 
economic characteristics (e.g. Estrin et  al., 2013a), 
namely, the rule of law (effective constraints on the 
executive branch of the government, taken from Pol-
ity IV project, coordinated by the Centre for Systemic 
Peace, Vienna, VA), plus the level of development 
(GDP per capita), inflation (GDP deflator), and GDP 
growth, all from World Bank. Furthermore, because 
the social homophily literature emphasises potential 
Table 1  Description of variables and descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max
/1/ Involved in nascent start-up or owner-manager of business < 42 month old 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
/2/ Involved as early venture stage informal investor within last 2 years 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
/3/ Age 20–24 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
/4/ Age 25–29 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
/5/ Age 30–34 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
/6/ Age 35–39 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
/7/Age 40–44 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
/8/ Age 45–49 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
/9/ Age 50–54 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
/10/ Age 55–59 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
/11/ Age 60–64 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
/12/ Female 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
/13/ Education: some secondary 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
/14/ Education: secondary 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
/15/ Education: tertiary 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
/16/ Manages and owns a business that is older than 42 months 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
/17/ In the past 12 months: sold, shut down, discontinued, or quit business 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
/18/ Medium income 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
/19/ High income 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
/20/ Share of established business owners (country-year) 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.38
/21/ Share of est. bus. owners (country-year-education) minus country-year share 0.00 0.02  − 0.27 0.45
/22/ Share of those who discontinued businesses (country-year) 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.30
/23/ Constrains on the executive branch of government (lagged) 5.99 5.89 1.00 7.00
/24/ Natural logarithm of population (lagged) 17.14 1.49 11.54 21.03
/25/ GDP per person employed (constant 2011 PPP $, lagged) 63,923 29,755 1837 197,259
/26/ Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %, lagged) 4.08 5.54  − 27.63 56.50
/27/ GDP growth (annual %, lagged) 2.72 3.32  − 14.33 22.59
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older than 42 months (H1)
1.654***
(0.022)
In the past 12 months, sold, shut down, 



























Table 2  (continued)
Variables (1)
Informal investor












GDP per person employed (constant 
2011 PPP $, lagged)
1.000
(0.000)




GDP growth (annual %, lagged) 1.022**
(0.008)
Year = 2002 0.624***
(0.075)
Year = 2003 0.211*
(0.129)
Year = 2004 1.158
(0.594)
Year = 2005 0.599***
(0.069)
Year = 2006 0.679***
(0.072)
Year = 2007 0.683***
(0.069)
Year = 2008 0.818*
(0.082)
Year = 2009 0.573***
(0.055)
Year = 2010 1.032
(0.108)
Year = 2011 0.936
(0.113)
Year = 2012 0.940
(0.087)
Year = 2013 0.889
(0.099)
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network size as the main channel of peer effects 
(McPherson et al., 2001), we also control for the pop-
ulation size of each country. All these macro-control 
variables are lagged by 1  year to alleviate potential 
endogeneity.
We present the variable definitions in Table  1. A 
correlation table is also available on request. Col-
linearity was not found to be a serious problem, and 
in any case, it would be counterbalanced by the very 
large sample size that makes coefficients insensitive 
to specification; as argued by Goldberger (1991), col-
linearity becomes a serious problem only if combined 
with ‘micronumerocity’.
 
3.2  Regression models
Our hypotheses are tested with models that estimate 
the likelihood that an individual is an early-stage new 
venture informal investor.5 This leads us to apply 
bivariate logit models. These models include the 
above listed explanatory variables. We apply multi-
level techniques, that is, the estimates are enhanced 
with country-year random effects to address potential 
problems of country- and time-specific heterogene-
ity (e.g. Hox et al., 2018; Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 
This design follows earlier GEM-based research (e.g. 
Autio & Acs, 2010; Estrin et al., 2013a; Estrin et al., 
2013b, 2016; Stephan et  al., 2015). Our hypothesis 
tests are based on the sign and significance of the rel-
evant independent variable coefficients.
4  Results
The results are presented in Tables  2, 3 and 4. To 
allow for the direct evaluation of the size of the esti-
mated effects, we present odd ratios instead of raw 
logit coefficients. For hypotheses 1 and 2, we rely 
initially on model 1 (in Table 2), estimated using the 
full set of individual- and country-level variables but 
excluding any interactive effects. To facilitate the 
analysis, in Table 2, we highlighted the correspond-
ing odds ratios in bold.
We use models 2, 3, 4 and 5 to test hypothesis 3 
concerning the cross-level interaction effects between 
individual entrepreneurial experience and the entre-
preneurial experience of the peer groups, again high-
lighting the odds ratios in bold.
Hypothesis 1 concerns the impact of business 
experience. The analysis yields strong support for this 
hypothesis: the coefficients on our indicator of busi-
ness experience related to individuals who manage 
or own a business older than 42 months are all posi-
tive and highly significant (models 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). 
The coefficient on our parallel indicator of experience 
(sold, shut down, discontinued or quit business in the 
past 12  months) is also statistically significant with 
the expected sign.
Hypothesis 2 concerns the impact of entrepreneur-
ship capital on the propensity to be an early-stage 
informal investor. Significantly strong positive peer 
effects are observed in most of the socio-demograph-
ics groups that we test in our model, namely, peer 
groups based on age, gender and income. However, 
entrepreneurship capital effects are not observed 
in the peer groups based on education categories 
(Table  2, model 1); we return to this issue in the 
discussion.
Based on the odds ratios, we also find support for 
hypothesis 3 concerning the moderating effects of 
entrepreneurship capital on the relationship between 
entrepreneurship experience and the likelihood of 
being an early venture stage informal investor. Thus, 
the odds ratios of the interactive term between indi-
vidual business experience and entrepreneurship cap-
ital are negative in models 2, 3, 4 and 5, and these 
effects are highly significant.
We note however the discussion on the validity 
of interactive effects in logit models as evaluated by 
odds ratios, initiated by Ai and Norton (2003). While 
there is a methodological tradition that supports 







Odd ratios reported instead of raw logit coefficients
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10
5 We estimate it jointly with that of the likelihood of an indi-
vidual being an entrepreneur to enhance the robustness of our 
results, because these two choices are highly interdepend-
ent (using gsem command in Stata). However, we only report 
results on informal investors, the concern of this paper; results 
on entrepreneurs are available on request.
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the odds ratio treatment of interactive effects (Buis, 
2010), the recent conclusion is that the (multiplica-
tive) effects based on odds ratios and the (additive) 
marginal effects should both be considered. These 
two are different ways to conceptualise the effects, 
and the problem is that they may or may not be con-
sistent with each other for interactions, both in terms 
of significance and even of direction (Dow et  al., 
2019). Therefore, we utilise Ai and Norton’s (2003) 
computational method for marginal effects, imple-
mented with appropriate handling of Margins com-
mand in Stata (Karaca-Mandic et  al., 2012). When 
our interactive effects are evaluated as marginal 
effects, the results are insignificant. Thus, hypothesis 
3 is only partly supported.
Our analysis yields other interesting findings. We 
further unpack the effects of previous entrepreneurial 
experience by having a second variable that can be 
considered a proxy for experience; that is, in addition 
to continued business ownership, in all our models, 
we also include a dummy variable corresponding to 
prior involvement in discontinued or sold businesses. 
The latter effect is always positive and highly signifi-
cant on the likelihood of getting involved as an infor-
mal investor.
Another important element of human capital, of a 
more general nature, is proxied by education (Estrin 
et al., 2016). Here, we find a clear pattern. When one 
moves higher up the educational ladder, the effect on 
the likelihood of being engaged in informal invest-
ment becomes larger.
Finally, we get some interesting results on macro-
economic variables that deserve further exploration. 
Not surprisingly, we found lagged economic growth to 
be associated positively with the likelihood of infor-
mal investment. More worthy of note, the finding from 
previous research that higher level of development 
is associated with lower entrepreneurial propensity 
(Estrin et al., 2019) does not seem to apply to informal 
investment activities; the likelihood of being an inves-
tor is actually stronger in developed economies.
5  Discussion
Informal investors should not be seen narrowly just 
as providers of early-stage entrepreneurial finance. 
Rather, we argue that informal investors are socially 
embedded individuals who make the decision to 
invest their own money in new ventures, influenced 
by both their individual attributes and their social 
context. Based on this insight, we develop a multi-
level theoretical framework on the factors influencing 
informal investment and test hypotheses concerning 
individual, peer and cross-level effects. We find that 
individual entrepreneurship experience and environ-
mentally embedded entrepreneurial capital both posi-
tively affect informal investment.
At the individual level, whether individuals act 
as informal investors is influenced by their prior 
entrepreneurship experience. Drawing from social 
homophily theories, we argue that past individual 
entrepreneurial experience is conducive to enhanc-
ing linkages and participation in the social networks 
of entrepreneurs that are particularly critical to 
the likelihood of being an informal investor. Thus, 
social homophily effects can result in the forma-
tion of ties between informal investors who are for-
mer entrepreneurs and business founders seeking 
investment.
However, it could also be that the role of experi-
ence is especially important for informal investors 
because of a possible selection effect. Informal inves-
tors need financial resources to engage in current 
entrepreneurial ventures, which imply that their pre-
vious entrepreneurial experience has probably been 
successful. Indeed, the evidence suggests that infor-
mal investors have significant financial muscle, which 
largely derives from previous entrepreneurial engage-
ment (OECD, 2011). We also control for household 
income in our estimating equations. Therefore, the 
finding of a strong positive effect of experience on 
informal investors suggests that there may be a pos-
sible selection effect via the accumulation of wealth. 
To shed more light on this issue, we compare our 
results on experience through established business 
ownership and management with experience accrued 
through past engagement in business that was dis-
continued. The effects of both variables on informal 
investor engagement are positive. However, the odds 
ratios related to discontinued businesses are much 
larger, in all models at least twice as large. This find-
ing implies that it is the experience rather than the 
(accumulated wealth based) selection effect  that 
is more important in explaining informal invest-
ment engagement. This is in line with research that 
calls for the examination of the role of failure in the 
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entrepreneurial process (Levie et al., 2011), and more 
research is needed here.
Turning to the contextual effects, we hypothesise 
positive social peer effects on informal investment; 
individuals embedded in social groups with a higher 
density of business owners are more likely to be 
informal investors. This idea is supported by the data. 
We find that peer effects — which we term entre-
preneurial capital — influence the likelihood that an 
individual chooses to be an investor consistently, in 
a variety of peer groups exhibiting entrepreneurial 
traits, where these groups are based on the character-
istics of age, gender, income, yet less so of education 
(though note the interactive effects). Furthermore, 
we find some evidence that social influence com-
pensates for an individual’s lack of experience, but 
here, the evidence is weaker; it crucially depends on 
how we evaluate interactive effects (additively versus 
multiplicatively).
6  Robustness test based on regional data
The models we discussed so far included peer effects 
based on country-level averages for particular refer-
ence groups. Here, we also verify if and how the 
homophily effects we postulated change when we dis-
aggregate from the national to the regional level. For 
this purpose, we utilise the UK GEM data with loca-
tion identifiers for 2002–2019, which we merged with 
the Office for National Statistics data for regional 
level controls. The UK is one of the very few national 
GEM teams that collects large annual samples (typi-
cally around 10,000 respondents), which enables 
meaningful regional comparisons (Hart et al., 2020). 
The results are presented in the Appendix (Table 5). 
They are based on single multilevel logit equations. 
The specifications follow closely those reported 
above in Table 2, except for some minor differences 
in groupings of age, income and education variables, 
where more detailed categories were available com-
pared to the worldwide sample. The random effects 
are now based on NUTS2 UK region — year com-
binations, as are the peer effects, and the four macro-
level controls which correspond to what we applied at 
country level. Thus, apart for more detailed (regional 
rather than national) groupings for some variables, 
the description of variables remains the same as in 
Table 1.
Interestingly, the share of established business 
owners calculated at NUTS2 UK level gains in sig-
nificance compared with the country-level effects 
we reported in Table  2. Across the five models we 
report in Table 5, for four models, the variable is sig-
nificant at 0.01 level, and for one model, it is signifi-
cant at 0.05 probability level. In contrast, in the pre-
vious country-level models reported in Tables 2 and 
3, these effects were significant either at the 0.05 or 
borderline significant at the 0.10 threshold. We could 
interpret these effects as a fifth type of peer group 
effect: a regional one based on neighbourhood. 
Hence, neighbourhood (region-based) effects are 
now more significant compared to country level, 
and those based on age and income (in models 2 to 
5 of Table  5) (corresponding to those we estimated 
in models reported in Table  2) are still significant 
though a bit weaker. However, some other  peer 
group  effects, those based on education and gender, 
become insignificant at the less aggregated level.
We think we understand why these effects may 
be relatively weaker for the UK. This is because 
when considering social effects, we need to take into 
account the context of informal institutions. In par-
ticular, we would expect more rigid social cleavages 
based on education, income, gender and possibly age 
in countries which are characterised by cultural values 
of high-power distance. The latter corresponds to the 
social acceptance of the unequal distribution of power 
(Hofstede et al., 2010). In that case, social status gains 
in importance, and it is based on income, education, 
and gender as related to traditional notions of patriar-
chy and possibly age. This implies that social barriers 
along these dimensions become stronger, and, as the 
social groups are more clearly separated, the homo-
phily effects within each group are stronger. Yet, the 
UK is characterised by low power distance cultural 
values (Taras et  al., 2012); therefore, the homophily 
effects may be weaker.
The UK is also characterised by high degree of 
individualism (Taras et  al., 2012), a cultural value 
dimension that is closely correlated with low power 
distance (Beugelsdijk & Welzel, 2018; Minkov et al., 
2017). Individualism corresponds to the situation 
where ties between people are loose and social groups 
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Table 3  Results of logit regressions, models with interactions
Variables (2) (3)
Informal investor Informal investor
Age 20–24 1.154*** 1.186***
(0.034) (0.035)
Age 25–29 1.315*** 1.407***
(0.039) (0.041)
Age 30–34 1.272*** 1.429***
(0.039) (0.041)
Age 35–39 1.250*** 1.444***
(0.040) (0.042)
Age 40–44 1.145*** 1.350***
(0.038) (0.039)
Age 45–49 1.143*** 1.364***
(0.039) (0.040)
Age 50–54 1.117** 1.337***
(0.039) (0.040)
Age 55–59 1.156*** 1.373***
(0.040) (0.042)




Education: some secondary 1.208*** 1.202***
(0.026) (0.027)
Education: secondary 1.443*** 1.443***
(0.030) (0.033)
Education: tertiary 1.840*** 1.832***
(0.039) (0.041)
Manages and owns a business that is older than 42 months (H1) 1.733*** 1.690***
(0.024) (0.022)
In the past 12 months, sold, shut down, discontinued, quit (H1 alt) 3.264*** 3.270***
(0.045) (0.045)
Medium income 1.296*** 1.296***
(0.017) (0.017)
High income 1.996*** 1.996***
(0.025) (0.025)
Share of establ. business owners (country-year) 2.700* 2.543 + 
(1.319) (1.243)
Share of est. bus. owners (country-year-age group) 4.593***
(0.648)
Manages/own est. bus. X Share of estab bus (c-y-age) (H3) 0.186***
(0.039)
Share of est. bus. owners (country-year-education category) 1.645*
(0.332)
Manages/own est. bus. X Share of estab bus (c-y-ed) (H3) 0.298**
(0.117)
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Table 3  (continued)
Variables (2) (3)
Informal investor Informal investor
Share of those who discontinued bus. (country-year) 12,532*** 13,581***
(8,341.688) (9,040.945)
Constrains on the executive branch of government (lagged) 0.985 0.982
(0.018) (0.018)
Natural logarithm of population (lagged) 0.940*** 0.939***
(0.015) (0.015)
GDP per person employed (const 2011 PPP $, lagged) 1.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %, lagged) 0.994 0.995
(0.004) (0.004)
GDP growth (annual %, lagged) 1.021* 1.021*
(0.008) (0.008)
Year = 2002 0.625*** 0.627***
(0.075) (0.076)
Year = 2003 0.213* 0.214*
(0.130) (0.131)
Year = 2004 1.148 1.151
(0.590) (0.593)
Year = 2005 0.603*** 0.603***
(0.070) (0.070)
Year = 2006 0.683*** 0.685***
(0.073) (0.073)
Year = 2007 0.687*** 0.686***
(0.070) (0.070)
Year = 2008 0.814* 0.814*
(0.082) (0.082)
Year = 2009 0.571*** 0.572***
(0.055) (0.055)
Year = 2010 1.011 1.014
(0.106) (0.106)
Year = 2011 0.919 0.922
(0.111) (0.112)
Year = 2012 0.928 0.930
(0.086) (0.087)
Year = 2013 0.885 0.887
(0.099) (0.099)
Year = 2014 0.997 0.999
(0.091) (0.091)
Random intercept[country_year] 2.718 2.718
(0.000) (0.000)
Var(random intercept) 1.269*** 1.269***
(0.021) (0.021)
Covariance of random intercepts 1.074*** 1.074***
(0.011) (0.011)
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are less cohesive (Hofstede et al., 2010). Social con-
tacts are characterised by more diverse patterns of 
interaction (Bennett & Nikolaev, 2020; Heine, 2020). 
This is why within-group relations that underlie 
homophily effects may be weaker in individualist 
societies.
Finally, the UK is a developed country, and that 
may also come with lower social differences. The 
gap between poor and good education may be rela-
tively narrower. Likewise, income inequalities may 
translate into less radical differences than in poor 
countries. Again, this would suggest that the with-
social group relations are more likely to be accom-
panied by multiple out-group relations, making our 
effects weaker. This conclusion may generalise to 
wider differences between developed and developing 
countries, but we have no comparative regional data 
to test it further.
7  Conclusions
Informal investors provide entrepreneurs with both 
finance and know-how. This observation led us to 
provide an analysis of the factors explaining an indi-
vidual’s propensity to engage in informal investment 
based on individuals’ entrepreneurial experience and 
contextual peer group effects. Our work can be con-
trasted with the more traditional framing, where the 
distinction between early-stage informal investors, 
business angels investing during the scaling up phase, 
and venture capitalists remains blurred.
In the past, it has proved difficult to test cross-level 
effects, concerning both individual and peer groups, 
in a single study, due to data constraints. It has been 
hard to identify good-sized datasets with well opera-
tionalised variables at an individual- and meso-level. 
However, by adopting the lens of peer groups, we 
have been able to construct meso-level peer influence 
variables and test them in junction with individual-
level and country-level effects in the largest exist-
ing entrepreneurship dataset. The huge cross-time 
and cross-country, individual GEM dataset has not 
previously been used to study peer social effects; to 
our best knowledge, we are the first to do so. Our 
approach opens new avenues for future efforts in 
cross-level studies. Of course, we do not propose that 
an individual has a realistic chance to form networks 
across his/her peer group country-wide, especially in 
large countries, though the effects of location will be 
to some extent mitigated by digitalisation leading to 
wider social networks. Nevertheless, if entrepreneur-
ial capital is higher in his/her peer group, the likeli-
hood that such local networks will be formed will 
also be higher, and this is our interpretation of the 
effects that we have found.
Our additional analysis of the UK data implies that 
culture may further influence the effect we observe 
here. Future studies can delve deeper into the com-
plexity that arises from the interplay between meso-
societal context and higher-level cultural context in 
affecting informal investment. This will require data 
with sufficiently large number of observations in both 
cross-country and within-country samples.
Related to that, the research presented here has 
some limitations. Perhaps most significantly, while 
the GEM database is a rich source of individual data 
about the decision to engage as an entrepreneur or an 
informal investor, our research is limited by the fact 
that it represents a series of cross-section time-series 
snapshots across countries, rather than a panel. As 
Hellmann and Thiele (2019) have highlighted, there 
is a dynamic element to the relationship between 
entrepreneurs and investors, which we have only been 
Table 3  (continued)
Variables (2) (3)





Odd ratios reported instead of raw logit coefficients
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10
 F. Qin et al.
1 3
Table 4  Results of logit regressions, models with interactions
Variables (4) Informal investor (5) Informal investor
Age 20–24 1.187*** 1.187***
(0.035) (0.035)
Age 25–29 1.410*** 1.411***
(0.041) (0.041)
Age 30–34 1.432*** 1.433***
(0.041) (0.041)
Age 35–39 1.447*** 1.449***
(0.042) (0.042)
Age 40–44 1.353*** 1.354***
(0.039) (0.039)
Age 45–49 1.367*** 1.368***
(0.040) (0.040)
Age 50–54 1.339*** 1.341***
(0.040) (0.040)
Age 55–59 1.376*** 1.378***
(0.042) (0.042)




Education: some secondary 1.203*** 1.198***
(0.026) (0.026)
Education: secondary 1.441*** 1.434***
(0.030) (0.030)
Education: tertiary 1.832*** 1.826***
(0.038) (0.038)
Manages and owns a business that is older than 42 m. (H2) 1.698*** 1.723***
(0.024) (0.024)
In the past 12 m, sold, shut down, discontinued, quit (H2 alt) 3.272*** 3.268***
(0.045) (0.045)
Medium income 1.243*** 1.295***
(0.018) (0.017)
High income 1.800*** 1.996***
(0.035) (0.025)
Share of establ. business owners (country-year) 2.440 + 2.400 + 
(1.187) (1.172)
Share of est. bus. owners (country-year-income group) 6.958***
(1.908)
Manages/own est. bus. X Share of estab bus (c-y-inc) (H3) 0.429*
(0.171)
Share of est. bus. owners (country-year-gender) 3.988***
(1.284)
Manages/own est. bus. X Share of estab bus (c-y-gen) (H3) 0.105***
(0.047)
Share of those who discontinued bus. (country-year) 11,444*** 13,785***
(7,592.493) (9,176.280)
Constrains on the executive branch of gov. (lagged) 0.980 0.983
(0.018) (0.018)
Natural logarithm of population (lagged) 0.937*** 0.939***
(0.015) (0.015)
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able to infer indirectly in our analysis. Furthermore, 
given that the institutions are likely to change only 
slowly (Williamson, 2000), the length of the time 
series available within GEM makes it difficult to iden-
tify institutional effects in a convincing manner. This 
may help to explain the absence of any significant 
1,290,164 observations
Odd ratios reported instead of raw logit coefficients
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10
Table 4  (continued)
Variables (4) Informal investor (5) Informal investor
GDP per person employed (const 2011 PPP $, lagged) 1.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %, lagged) 0.995 0.995
(0.004) (0.004)
GDP growth (annual %, lagged) 1.022** 1.021*
(0.008) (0.008)
Year = 2002 0.627*** 0.627***
(0.075) (0.076)
Year = 2003 0.213* 0.214*
(0.130) (0.131)
Year = 2004 1.162 1.150
(0.596) (0.592)
Year = 2005 0.600*** 0.603***
(0.069) (0.070)
Year = 2006 0.681*** 0.684***
(0.072) (0.073)
Year = 2007 0.682*** 0.685***
(0.069) (0.070)
Year = 2008 0.821* 0.813*
(0.082) (0.082)
Year = 2009 0.576*** 0.571***
(0.055) (0.055)
Year = 2010 1.038 1.013
(0.108) (0.106)
Year = 2011 0.939 0.922
(0.113) (0.112)
Year = 2012 0.942 0.929
(0.087) (0.086)
Year = 2013 0.891 0.886
(0.099) (0.099)
Year = 2014 1.003 0.999
(0.092) (0.091)
Random intercept [country_year] 2.718 2.718
(0.000) (0.000)
Var(random intercept) 1.267*** 1.269***
(0.021) (0.021)
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relationship between institutional quality (rule of law) 
and the likelihood of informal investors’ engagement. 
To some extent, these limitations will be addressed 
by the passing of time, as additional years become 
available for analysis. However, the key limitation, 
the absence of panel data, can only be addressed by a 
sustained data gathering exercise.
Our work has significant implications for policy-
makers. As we have noted, the literature focuses on the 
role of business angels, who are often seen as informal 
venture capitalists. We instead focus on the early-stage 
informal investors and conceptualise them as indi-
viduals who choose to use their experience and tacit 
knowledge, as well as their financial resources, to sup-
port entrepreneurs. Thus, from the policy perspective, 
the role of informal investors is central to the estab-
lishment of effective entrepreneurial ecosystems (Elert 
et  al., 2019). Our results suggest that their engage-
ment is sensitive not only to financial and tax incen-
tives, upon which policy is now concentrated, but also 
to the entrepreneurial social environment and to peer 
group influences. Indeed, peer group effects substi-
tute for direct entrepreneurial experience in the like-
lihood of informal investment. Thus, polices towards 
the formation of healthy entrepreneurial ecosystems 
should build more closely on networks of former 
entrepreneurs and people of similar peer group char-
acteristics. Future research could also usefully explore 
in more depth what these characteristics might be. An 
additional line of inquiry could also explore cultural 
influences that either facilitate or inhibit use of some 
specific peer-based networks in societies, conditional 
on how much these cultures stress ingroups versus 
outgroups or strong versus weak ties, following the 
Granevotter’s (1973) terminology.
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Table 5  Results of logit regressions, UK sample, 2002–2019. Dependent variable: informal investor
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age = 25–34 years  − 0.091  − 0.121  − 0.091  − 0.091  − 0.090
(0.083) (0.084) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083)
Age = 35–44 years  − 0.033  − 0.116  − 0.032  − 0.033  − 0.032
(0.079) (0.088) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
Age = 45–54 years 0.023  − 0.084 0.024 0.023 0.024
(0.079) (0.093) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
Age = 55–64 years 0.247** 0.144 0.247** 0.247** 0.247**
(0.080) (0.093) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
Age = 65 years and more 0.466*** 0.429*** 0.465*** 0.466*** 0.466***
(0.087) (0.089) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087)
Female  − 0.469***  − 0.469***  − 0.469***  − 0.469***  − 0.390***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.077)
Education status = doctorate 0.818*** 0.816*** 0.817*** 0.840*** 0.818***
(0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.128) (0.127)
Education status = master’s degree 1.017*** 1.016*** 1.017*** 1.032*** 1.017***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.091)
Education status = bachelor’s degree 0.752*** 0.751*** 0.751*** 0.761*** 0.752***
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
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Table 5  (continued)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Education status = a levels or equivalent 0.614*** 0.613*** 0.612*** 0.617*** 0.614***
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087)
Education status = gcse or equivalent 0.316*** 0.314*** 0.315*** 0.320*** 0.316***
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
Education status = vocational qualification 0.411*** 0.410*** 0.411*** 0.421*** 0.411***
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096)
Education status = other qualification 0.201 0.197 0.197 0.207 0.200
(0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160)
Manages & owns a business that is older than 42 m 0.711*** 0.694*** 0.693*** 0.721*** 0.706***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053)
In the past 12 m, sold, shut down, discontinued 1.717*** 1.717*** 1.716*** 1.716*** 1.717***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Head of household income = £11,500 to £17,499 0.296*** 0.295*** 0.296*** 0.296*** 0.296***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Head of household income = £17,500 to £29,999 0.598*** 0.597*** 0.546*** 0.598*** 0.598***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.081) (0.078) (0.078)
Head of household income = £30,000 to £49,999 0.753*** 0.752*** 0.701*** 0.753*** 0.752***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.081) (0.079) (0.079)
Head of household income = £50,000 to £99,999 1.058*** 1.058*** 0.917*** 1.057*** 1.057***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.096) (0.081) (0.081)
Head of household income = £100,000 or more 1.778*** 1.778*** 1.640*** 1.778*** 1.778***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.103) (0.090) (0.090)
Share of established bus owners (NUTS2-yr) 3.217** 3.078** 2.989* 3.240** 3.026*
(1.181) (1.183) (1.185) (1.181) (1.195)
Share of establ. bus. owners (age 6 cat, NUTS2-yr) 1.476*
(0.666)
Share of establ. bus. owners (income, NUTS2-yr) 1.982**
(0.728)
Share of establ. bus. owners (education, NUTS2-yr)  − 0.607
(0.537)
Share of establ. bus. owners (gender, NUTS2-yr) 1.600
(1.358)
GDP growth (annual %, lagged, NUTS2)  − 0.309  − 0.351  − 0.285  − 0.302  − 0.282
(1.185) (1.185) (1.184) (1.186) (1.186)
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %, lagged, NUTS2) 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.012
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
GDP p.c. (constant prices, lagged, NUTS2) 4.799* 4.618* 4.990* 4.822* 4.817*
(2.312) (2.314) (2.305) (2.313) (2.314)
Natural logarithm of population (lagged, NUTS2) 0.072 0.070 0.076 + 0.072 0.072
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
year of survey = 2003  − 0.192 +  − 0.182  − 0.179  − 0.194 +  − 0.195 + 
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
year of survey = 2004  − 0.311*  − 0.307*  − 0.300*  − 0.313*  − 0.313*
(0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123)
 F. Qin et al.
1 3
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Com-
mons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits 
use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any 
medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Crea-
tive Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The 
images or other third party material in this article are included 
in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated 
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your 
intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds 
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly 
from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit 
http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen ses/ by/4. 0/.
Table 5  (continued)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
year of survey = 2005  − 0.210 +  − 0.202  − 0.205  − 0.212 +  − 0.215 + 
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126)
year of survey = 2006  − 0.335*  − 0.325*  − 0.329*  − 0.336*  − 0.339*
(0.135) (0.135) (0.134) (0.135) (0.135)
year of survey = 2007  − 0.366*  − 0.347*  − 0.349*  − 0.368*  − 0.371*
(0.158) (0.158) (0.157) (0.158) (0.158)
year of survey = 2008  − 0.650***  − 0.640**  − 0.653***  − 0.649***  − 0.655***
(0.195) (0.195) (0.194) (0.195) (0.195)
year of survey = 2009  − 0.832***  − 0.824***  − 0.835***  − 0.831***  − 0.837***
(0.242) (0.242) (0.241) (0.242) (0.242)
year of survey = 2010 0.087 0.092 0.081 0.087 0.087
(0.250) (0.249) (0.249) (0.250) (0.250)
year of survey = 2011  − 0.095  − 0.085  − 0.101  − 0.096  − 0.101
(0.246) (0.246) (0.245) (0.246) (0.246)
year of survey = 2012  − 0.042  − 0.039  − 0.045  − 0.041  − 0.043
(0.256) (0.255) (0.255) (0.256) (0.256)
year of survey = 2013  − 0.268  − 0.268  − 0.279  − 0.267  − 0.269
(0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.282) (0.282)
year of survey = 2014  − 0.171  − 0.170  − 0.177  − 0.169  − 0.169
(0.299) (0.299) (0.298) (0.299) (0.300)
year of survey = 2015  − 0.177  − 0.178  − 0.196  − 0.176  − 0.176
(0.323) (0.323) (0.322) (0.323) (0.323)
year of survey = 2016  − 0.021  − 0.015  − 0.042  − 0.021  − 0.020
(0.384) (0.384) (0.383) (0.384) (0.384)
year of survey = 2017  − 0.101  − 0.102  − 0.110  − 0.101  − 0.099
(0.364) (0.363) (0.363) (0.364) (0.364)
Constant  − 7.502***  − 7.404***  − 7.708***  − 7.501***  − 7.564***
(1.375) (1.375) (1.374) (1.375) (1.377)
Natural logarithm of random intercept variance  − 5.048***  − 5.053***  − 5.118***  − 5.041***  − 5.022***
(1.273) (1.271) (1.340) (1.264) (1.245)
Observations 237,135 237,135 237,135 237,135 237,135
Number of NUTS2-years groups 555 555 555 555 555
Standard errors in parentheses
Odd ratios reported instead of raw logit coefficients
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10
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